

## XIX

### Karnataka

#### Emerging Patterns in National and State-level Elections

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Karnataka politics has seen many a political twist and sharp electoral turn in the past three decades.<sup>1</sup> A state that was traditionally seen as a bastion of the Congress party saw two landmark state assembly elections which dramatically altered the course of politics in the state. The first such landmark election was the 1983 assembly elections (Cheluva Raju et al. 1983). Until then, the state had been strongly pro-Congress. The party had near-monopoly over power, having remained the ruling party from Independence until 1983. Even in the Lok Sabha elections from the state, Congress always came up with a creditable performance.<sup>2</sup> The 1983 elections saw the first ever defeat of Congress Party in a state assembly poll in Karnataka. However, the categorical defeat of Congress was not accompanied by a decisive victory in favour of the main opposition party, the Janata Party. In a sense, voters handed down a defeat to the Congress but did not anoint an alternative ruling party. Janata Party emerged as the single largest party but was able to form a minority government with the support of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Left parties. It was only two years later, in 1985, that under the leadership of chief minister Ramakrishna Hegde, the Janata party secured a clear majority in the assembly elections, ushering in a clear two-party race in Karnataka with BJP remaining as a minor third force.

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In subsequent assembly elections (1989, 1994 and 1999), power alternated between Congress and Janata Party/Dal (Shastri 2011). The second watershed in Karnataka's electoral politics were the 2004 assembly elections (Shastri and Ramaswamy 2004, 2009). In this poll, the ruling Congress was defeated but once again (like 1983) no clear victor emerged. BJP did reasonably well in Karnataka, becoming the single largest party, but both Janata Dal (Secular) (JDS) and Congress won a significant chunk of seats. The 2004 elections saw a shift in the nature and structure of the two-party competition in the states, with BJP emerging as the single largest party in the state assembly, making it appear as if it were a three-party race in the state involving the BJP, Congress and JDS. Four years down the line, in 2008, the assembly polls saw the BJP coming to power, thus redrawing the lines of competition in the state with the Congress and BJP being the key political players and JDS pushed to a minor third position (Shastri 2013).

Karnataka was a key battleground state in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Congress was in power in the state for less than a year. The party had fervently hoped that the state would provide a large contingent of members to the lower house. BJP had always considered Karnataka as its launch pad in South India. South of the Vindhyas, this was the only state in which the party had been in power. A good performance by the party in Lok Sabha polls in the state would be a useful bonus in its efforts at reaching the halfway mark. Karnataka politics had an important third force, JDS, which was hoping to retain its presence in the lower house of Parliament by picking up a few seats in the state.

The election results ran counter to many of the past trends and precedents in the state. After many years, Karnataka went with the national trend<sup>3</sup> (Shastri 2011). Second, for the first time in Karnataka, a ruling party in the state was unable to win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha elections within less than a year of coming to power.<sup>4</sup> What accounted for BJP's creditable performance in the Lok Sabha elections from Karnataka? Why was the ruling party in the state (Congress) not able to retain the momentum within a year of coming to power? This chapter would argue that the 2014 Lok Sabha verdict in Karnataka was a clear impact of the leadership factor and inability of the Congress to strengthen its organisational base and build a wider social coalition. Like in many other parts of the country, BJP drew greater support from among the affluent and more educated and those from urban areas in the state. While undertaking this analysis, the chapter draws heavily from the Lokniti-CSDS NES 2014, Karnataka Election Study 2013 and the Lokniti-CSDS tracker polls.

Two trends in Karnataka merit attention and they provide an important backdrop for the analysis of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections from the state. First, since 1989, the Karnataka voter has gone against the national trend in Lok Sabha elections. If in the 1989 elections, the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress was

defeated in the Lok Sabha polls, Karnataka expressed its confidence in Congress Party by sending a huge contingent of Congress MPs to the Lok Sabha. Later, in 1996, when BJP emerged as the single largest party in the Lok Sabha, the state elected a majority of MPs from the Janata Dal. In the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha polls, when the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) came to power at the national level, Congress did well in the Lok Sabha polls in the state. In 2004, when the BJP-led NDA was defeated and replaced by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), BJP put up a creditable show in Karnataka, winning a majority of the seats. Once again, in 2009, while the Congress-led UPA returned to power nationally, BJP held its ground in the Lok Sabha polls from Karnataka. Thus, Karnataka bucked the national trend when it came to Lok Sabha elections in the past quarter century.

A second factor that assumes relevance in the state is that no ruling party has been voted back to power in the state in the past quarter century. In 1989, the ruling Janata Dal was defeated and Congress was voted to power. In the succeeding elections held in 1994, Congress was voted out and Janata Dal was brought back to power. The year 1999 saw the Janata Dal being routed and replaced once again by Congress; 2004 saw the defeat of the ruling Congress but did not see a clear victory to any party in the Opposition. It was only in 2008 that BJP was voted to power and at the end of five years, the ruling BJP was defeated by Congress in the 2013 state assembly polls. Thus, the state witnessed a revolving-door policy when it came to every state assembly election.

In terms of regions, the integrated state of Karnataka<sup>5</sup> has been considered since 1956 to be made up of four regions. The bulk of the state consisted of the Old Mysore region, which includes the regions that were part of the princely state of Mysore. The Hyderabad-Karnatak region refers to parts of Karnataka that were part of the erstwhile Hyderabad state. The Mumbai-Karnatak region consists of those districts which were part of the British India Province of Bombay. Some parts of Karnataka were also integrated into the state from what was part of the Madras Presidency region. Today, for purposes of electoral analysis, Karnataka is divided into six regions. The Mumbai-Karnatak region, Hyderabad-Karnatak region, coastal Karnataka, central Karnataka, Bengaluru and South Karnataka.

Karnataka politics has also seen the dominance of two backward peasant proprietary castes, the Lingayats and Vokkaligas. A majority of the members of the legislative assembly since 1956 have hailed from these two dominant castes. Fourteen of the 20 chief ministers of the state and a majority of the members of the council of ministers have been from the two dominant castes (see Shastri 2008).

Both as a state and in terms of its politics, Karnataka has several unique features. A state which witnessed a one-party dominant system until 1983

saw the emergence of a two-party competition involving the Congress and Janata Party/Dal in the 1980s and 1990s. The slow rise of BJP, which over time displaced Janata Dal/JDS to the third position, emerged as a player south of the Vindhyas, first in Karnataka. The state was verily a launching pad for the BJP in the south of the country. This forms an ideal context to assess the impact and implications of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in the state.

### The Election Results in a Comparative Context

BJP managed to win 17 of the 28 seats in the state, two less than its tally of 2009. Congress managed to win nine seats and increased its tally by three seats as compared to the previous election. The JDS won two seats, a fall by one seat as compared to 2009. Though BJP won close to double the seats secured by the Congress, its vote share was a mere two percentage points higher. Further, in the context of the wider defeat of Congress Party across the nation, its Karnataka contingent was the largest compared to the numbers elected from other states of India (Table 19.1).

Table 19.1 Seats Won and Votes Polled in Karnataka in the 2014 Lok Sabha Elections

|                       | BJP | Congress | JDS | Others |
|-----------------------|-----|----------|-----|--------|
| Seats won (out of 28) | 17  | 9        | 2   | 0      |
| Votes Polled (%)      | 43  | 40.8     | 11  | 5.2    |

Source: Adapted from <http://ceokarnataka.kar.nic.in>. (accessed 12 December 2014). Reproduced by permission of Election Commission of India (ECI).

In the summer of 2013, Congress came to power in Karnataka defeating the ruling BJP. While explaining the electoral success of the Congress in that election, it has been asserted that the popular perception of the poor performance of the BJP government had a major role to play in Congress' victory. In an important sense, the 2013 elections were more significant because of the rout of the BJP than a decisive mandate in favour of Congress (Shastri 2013). One could explain the inability of the ruling Congress to repeat its 2013 performance a year later, as a critical issue in this poll was the disenchantment with 10 years of UPA rule and the positive impact of the alternative, especially in terms of the leadership presented by the BJP.

It is also important to record that when asked when they decided whom to vote for, NES 2014 data records that close to one-fourth of the respondents said that they took this decision on election day, another 4 of every 10 said during the campaign and a little less than one-fourth said well before the campaign. It is very clear that close to two-thirds of the respondents in Karnataka stated that they took this decision after the campaign commenced. If the campaign strategies of the major parties were to be assessed, it is noticed that all the 28 BJP candidates had a one-point campaign agenda—a vote for them was a vote for BJP's prime ministerial candidate. One of the seniormost BJP contestants in Karnataka, Ananth Kumar,<sup>6</sup> declared that the 'contest in Bangalore South (his constituency) is Modi versus Rahul Gandhi' (Ataulla 2014). On the other hand, the effort of the Congress in Karnataka was to deflect attention away from UPA's performance and showcase the achievements of the one-year-old Congress government in the state. The party general secretary in Karnataka, Digvijay Singh, made a statement that he was convinced that under the leadership of chief minister Siddaramaiah, 'the Congress will get good results in the Lok Sabha elections' (DNA 2014). During the campaign, Siddaramaiah attacked the previous BJP government in the state for engaging in corruption and attacked the BJP prime ministerial candidate by appealing to the voters that 'the man who could not stop riots in Gujarat was unfit to rule the nation' (Times of India 2014). The JDS on the other hand was keen to retain its presence in the Lok Sabha and its campaign highlighted the limitations of the two national parties and the need to have a powerful regional party in the lower house of Parliament.

### Dissecting the Verdict

#### The Main Pointers


An in-depth analysis of the election results taken in consonance with the data emerging from NES 2014 provide important explanations to the electoral outcome. The decisiveness of the BJP victory in Karnataka is seen from the fact that in as many as 9 of the 17 seats it won, the margin of victory was more than 10 per cent of the valid votes polled. In only one seat, its victory margin was less than 2 per cent of the valid votes polled. In the case of Congress, only 2 of its 9 victories were by impressive margins of more than 10 per cent of the valid votes polled. In one-third of the seats it won, the victory margin was less than 1 per cent of the valid votes polled.

If the 2014 Lok Sabha results from Karnataka are analysed in terms of the outcomes in each of the assembly segments, the commendable performance

of the BJP becomes even more visible. Each of the 28 parliamentary constituencies in Karnataka has eight assembly segments.<sup>7</sup> In 4 of the 17 seats that BJP won, the party led in all the 32 assembly segments. In another five Lok Sabha seats, it conceded one assembly segment in each Lok Sabha seat to the Congress. On the other hand, Congress was able to gain a lead in all eight assembly segments in only one of the nine seats it won. In two of the seats it conceded the majority in four of the assembly segments to its principal rival and in one Lok Sabha seat it won it conceded the majority to the opposition BJP and JDS in 6 of the 8 assembly segments. In the case of JDS too, in one of the two seats it won it conceded the lead to the opposition Congress in 5 of the 8 assembly segments. This clearly implies that in many of the seats won by the Congress and JDS, their victory was less impressive as compared to that of the BJP.

In the 2013 assembly elections in the state, Congress won 122<sup>8</sup> seats and BJP and JDS won 40 each. Were the parties able to retain the lead in the assembly segments they had won (in 2013) in the Lok Sabha polls? Congress was able to retain the lead in only one-third (44 out of 133) of the seats. It conceded the lead to BJP in as many as 75 of these seats and to the JDS in three. The BJP on the other hand held on to close to 90 per cent of the seats it had won in 2013 (35 of 40), conceding the rest (five) to the Congress. JDS was able to maintain the lead in only one-third of the seats it had won in 2013 (13 of 40). In the 2014 polls, BJP had a lead in 133 of the 224 assembly segments, Congress in 74 and the JDS in 17 (Figure 19.1). This is yet another indicator of the decisiveness of the BJP victory in the state.

Figure 19.1 Karnataka from 2013 Assembly Polls to 2014 Lok Sabha Polls



Source: Adapted from <http://ceokarnataka.kar.nic.in> (accessed 12 December 2014). Reproduced by permission of ECI.


The BJP victory was clearly visible in some of the regions of the state. It swept coastal Karnataka by winning all three seats in the region, it won all but one of the seats in the Mumbai-Karnatak, central Karnataka and Bengaluru regions. The seats in the Hyderabad-Karnataka region were shared evenly by the BJP and Congress. In the southern Karnataka region, BJP fared poorly winning only 1 of the 7 seats. Close to half the Congress victories were in southern Karnataka and the JDS picked up both its seats in this region. When the BJP rose to prominence in the 1990s and early 2000s, its main strengths were in the regions where it reasserted its presence in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls. Doing well in the southern Karnataka belt has always been a challenge for the BJP (Shastri and Ramaswamy 2004; Shastri and Padmavathi 2009; Manor 2008).

Prior to the start of the election campaign, Lokniti-CSDS conducted a pre-poll survey in which respondents were asked to evaluate the UPA government at the Centre. Over 3 of every 10 respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the central government. A little over half the respondents were lukewarm in their response and said that they were somewhat satisfied with the government. Past experience in Karnataka surveys has shown that the level of tolerance among voters towards their government is reasonably high (Shastri and Devi 2014). If close to one-third were to express their unhappiness with the government, it indicates a comparatively high level of dissent. An added factor which has been discussed earlier is the fact that close to two-thirds of the voters said that they decided whom to vote for after the campaign began. When asked in NES 2014 about their assessment of candidate choice in the elections, BJP appears to have found favour. Close to 9 of every 10 of those who voted for the BJP in Karnataka stated that the party made a better choice of candidates as compared to Congress and JDS. Interestingly, over 4 of every 10 who voted for Congress and JDS candidates stated that the BJP made a better choice of candidates as compared to their parties.

### Critical Demographic Differences

Much of the election campaign this time around was run through the media. Based on NES data, respondents in Karnataka were categorised into those with high media exposure, moderate media exposure, low media exposure and no media exposure. The support for BJP was 20 percentage points higher than for Congress among those who had high and moderate media exposure (Figure 19.2). On the other hand, Congress scored over the BJP (with a lesser degree of intensity) when it comes to those with low or no media exposure.

Figure 19.2 Media Exposure and Support for BJP/Congress in Karnataka (%), 2014



Note:  $n = 1,073$ ; the total does not add up to 100 as only those who stated that they voted for Congress and BJP are taken into account

Source: NES 2014 dataset

A linked factor is that support for BJP tended to rise with greater access to education and the reverse was true in the case of the Congress. Close to 6 of every 10 of those who had a college degree stated that they voted for BJP. This percentage declines when one assesses the response of those whose educational level was below primary, where only one-third claimed that they voted for BJP. The same is true in the case of those who did not know how to read and write. On the other hand, close to half of those who could not read and write stated that they voted for the Congress, while just one-third of those with a college degree reported voting for the party. Further, the largest percentage gap among those who voted for the BJP and Congress is found among first-time and middle-aged voters. There is a 7 percentage point gap between the two parties (with BJP being ahead) among first-time voters. This difference rises to 16 percentage points when those in the 36 to 45 age group are taken into account (again in favour of the BJP). In the older generation (56+), Congress takes a 20 percentage point lead over BJP.

It is also evident that BJP did significantly better in the urban areas of the state, especially in Bengaluru city. In rural Karnataka, Congress had an 8 percentage point lead over the BJP. In the towns and cities, BJP was ahead of

Congress by 17 percentage points while in Bengaluru, it was ahead by over 30 percentage points.

It is also clear that the more affluent the voter, the more likely they were to support the BJP. Among the rich, two-thirds of the respondents reported voting for BJP while just over one-fourth stated that they voted for the Congress.

While aggregate data provides evidence of the scale of BJP victory, survey data also points to some factors that could have contributed to the success of the BJP and dismal performance of the Congress. Given the fact that most respondents stated that they made their decision on whom to vote for after the start of the campaign, the choice of candidates, nature of the campaign and media exposure seem to have had an impact. BJP was not just able to sway the first-time voter and the middle-aged, but those with access to education, living in urban areas and more affluent appeared to have moved towards BJP too. A correlation analysis indicates that the preference for voting BJP is positively and significantly correlated to economic class, level of education and place of residence. As one moves from the poor to the more well-to-do, the likelihood to vote for BJP increases. Within education, there is an increase in support for the BJP with greater access to education. As one moves from rural areas to urban locales, the support for BJP clearly rises (Table 19.2).

Table 19.2 Correlation Analysis of Voting Preference for the BJP in Karnataka, 2014

|                                         |                              | Party voted<br>for in Lok<br>Sabha 2014 | Economic<br>class | Education<br>(respondent) | Locality |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| Party voted<br>for in Lok<br>Sabha 2014 | Pearson<br>correlation       | 1                                       | 0.080*            | 0.165*                    | 0.133*   |
|                                         | Significance<br>(two-tailed) | —                                       | 0.017             | 0.000                     | 0.000    |
|                                         | N                            | 900                                     | 900               | 896                       | 900      |

Note:  $N = 900$ .

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: CSDS Data Unit.


### Did Leadership Matter?

This chapter argues that the leadership factor too played an important role in swaying the verdict in favour of BJP in Karnataka. NES 2014 shows that voters

were generally well disposed towards the Congress government in the state but clearly focused on the choice for the Centre. Over 9 of every 10 respondents said that Chief Minister Siddaramiah was the right choice for chief ministership. When asked to rank the present Congress government in the state with the previous BJP government, 6 of every 10 respondents said that the present Congress government was far better. If one were to disaggregate those who voted for the Congress and the BJP, 9 of every 10 Congress voters favoured the current Congress government while 6 of every 10 BJP voters supported the previous BJP government. It is useful to record that over one-fourth of those who voted for the BJP said that the Congress state government was better. This explains why the rout faced by Congress Party was less intense in Karnataka as compared to some other states where it was in power or had a presence.

When it came to the Lok Sabha polls, there were clearly some other factors working on the minds of the voters. In Karnataka, BJP had strategically converted the 2014 election campaign as a choice between their prime ministerial candidate Modi and the Congress leader Rahul Gandhi. This proved decisive. Modi was ahead of Gandhi as the most preferred prime ministerial name by a mere 2 percentage points.<sup>9</sup> However, when asked to comment on who was best suited for leadership, Modi was ahead of Gandhi by a wide margin on all indicators. The difference varied from three to nine percentage points.

Figure 19.3 Preferred Leader in Terms of Qualities: Modi versus Gandhi (%), Karnataka 2014




Note: N = 1,061.

Source: NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS data set.

When asked about the choices of leaders at the national level to resolve important issues or protect social groups, Modi was ahead of Gandhi by relatively significant margins, save on the question of protecting the interests of Muslims (Figures 19.3 and 19.4).

Figure 19.4 Preferred Leader to Solve Problems/Protect Groups: Modi versus Gandhi, Karnataka 2014




Note: N = 1,006.

Source: NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS data set.

A clear indicator of the role of leadership was seen in the response to a question in NES 2014 on whether one would have changed one's voting preference if Modi were not the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP. The response in Karnataka

Figure 19.5 If Modi Had Not Been the Prime Ministerial Candidate of the BJP, Would Your Voting Choice Have Changed? (%), Karnataka 2014



Note: N = 1,006.

Source: NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS data set.

gives a clear indication to what could have crucially impacted on the vote. Across the state, 4 of every 10 respondents stated that if Modi were not the BJP prime ministerial candidate, their choice of party would have changed. Another one-fourth said it would have made no difference and the remaining respondents were unsure. Thus, across the state, the Modi factor influenced voting preference of 4 of every 10 voters. If one were to look at those who voted for BJP, the picture alters in a significant way. Now, 6 of every 10 of those who voted for the BJP stated that their voting preference would have changed if Modi had not been BJP's prime ministerial candidate. Another one-fourth said that they would have continued to vote for the BJP even if Modi had not been the prime ministerial candidate and the remaining respondents were unsure. Thus, among those who voted for the BJP, the Modi factor seems to have been decisive in influencing the choice of close to two-thirds of the respondents. Clearly, there was much less ambivalence among BJP voters on this critical question. The leadership factor was, thus, vital factor in influencing voter choice (Figure 19.5).

### The Social Coalition

Finally, it is also clear that the Congress was unable to expand the social coalition that it had created during the 2013 Lok Sabha elections. The merger of B. S. Yeddyurappa's Karnataka Janata Paksha (KJP) with the BJP resulted in the consolidation of the Lingayat vote, especially in northern Karnataka. Karnataka chief minister Siddaramaiah has consciously developed a non-dominant backward caste, Dalit and minority coalition, popularly called Alpasankhyataru, Hindulidavaru Mattu Dalitaru or AHINDA in the local language. By bringing together the non-dominant backward castes, the strategy was to pose a counter-weight to backward caste domination in politics (Shastri 2008).<sup>10</sup> Evidence from NES 2014 indicates that the non-dominant backward-caste and Muslim vote was firmly with Congress. It is important to record that data show that one-fourth of the Muslim vote went to the BJP and the JDS secured a much smaller share of the minority vote. By not making it a more inclusive coalition, Congress faced serious backlash. The Lingayat vote once again strongly consolidated behind the BJP. BJP emerged as a powerful force in Karnataka with the support of this dominant caste (Shastri and Ramaswamy 2004; Shastri and Padmavathi 2009). The unhappiness of the Vokkaliga community on not being accommodated in the Congress social alliance did lead to a three-way split in the Vokkaliga vote, with the BJP gaining significantly especially in Bengaluru city. The upper-caste vote, which has traditionally been with the BJP, remained with it this time also. Thus, the inability of Congress to broaden its social coalition on the one hand and the consolidation of the votes of one dominant caste (the Lingayats) in favour of the BJP and a three-way split in

the vote of the other dominant caste (the Vokkaligas) on the other paved the way for BJP to move ahead of its opponents (Table 19.3).

Table 19.3 Social Base of Parties: 2014 Lok Sabha Elections from Karnataka (%)

| Caste        | BJP | Congress | JDS | Others |
|--------------|-----|----------|-----|--------|
| Upper castes | 62  | 33       | 3   | 2      |
| Vokkaliga    | 38  | 29       | 31  | 2      |
| Lingayat     | 63  | 23       | 10  | 4      |
| Other OBCs   | 37  | 44       | 10  | 9      |
| SCs          | 35  | 43       | 13  | 9      |
| STs          | 35  | 58       | 5   | 2      |
| Muslims      | 25  | 68       | 5   | 2      |

Note: *N* = 1,073.

Source: NES 2014, Lokniti-CSDS data set.

### Summing Up

The Lok Sabha verdict from Karnataka was a vote for the BJP on its leadership. It was also an expression of unhappiness with the UPA government. The inability of the Congress to stitch a wider social coalition contributed to their winning a limited number of seats. If Congress did not perform as badly in Karnataka as it did in some other states in India it was on account of the relatively clean image of its one-year-old government, which still enjoyed goodwill among the people. Like in many other states, it was clearly evident that the more affluent, those with access to higher education and those living in urban areas tended to support the BJP. Karnataka was also among the states that categorically proved that leadership clearly matters in influencing voting behaviour. BJP was able to strike a chord with the voters by projecting leadership, while its principal opposition faced the elections fighting anti-incumbency and a leadership that failed to inspire confidence among the voters.

The 2014 elections also clearly indicated the emergence of a two-party competition in the state between the Congress and the BJP, with the JDS becoming a distant third player. Subsequent developments have more or less confirmed this trend. Karnataka remains a politically critical state for the Congress as it is one of its last surviving bastions. For the BJP, the state is the

party's first launching pad in the South and also the political ground that can engineer its effective electoral presence in the five southern states of India, enabling the party leadership to realise the dream of transforming the BJP as a truly 'polity-wide' party.

## Notes

1. This chapter was written prior to the 2018 Karnataka assembly elections.
2. Even in the famous 1977 Lok Sabha elections held during Emergency which saw the national rout of the Congress, the party did reasonably well in Karnataka.
3. In 1989, when the Congress was defeated at the national level, it won a majority of seats in Karnataka; in 1999, when the BJP-led NDA came to power in Delhi, the state sent a majority Congress contingent to the Lok Sabha; in 2004 and 2009, when UPA was voted to power at the Centre, a majority of the Lok Sabha MPs elected belonged to the BJP.
4. The 1996 Lok Sabha elections were held two years after the Janata Dal had come to power in the state. The ruling Janata Dal won a majority of the Lok Sabha seats in the state in this election. Later in 2009, when the Lok Sabha polls were held a year after the BJP came to power (2008), the ruling party in the state bagged a majority of the seats from the state.
5. The integrated state of Mysore was formed in 1956. The name was later changed to Karnataka in 1972.
6. It is relevant to point out that Ananth Kumar was perceived as a pro-Advani leader.
7. The 224 seats in the Karnataka assembly are distributed among the 28 Lok Sabha seats in such a way that there are eight assembly segments in each Lok Sabha seat.
8. When the 2013 assembly elections were held, only 223 seats saw polling as the election was countermanded in one seat (Periyapatna). Congress won 121 seats. Later, the Periyapatna seat too was won by the Congress when the elections were conducted there.
9. While 33 per cent stated that they would like to see Modi as prime minister, another 31 per cent mentioned the name of Gandhi.
10. This approach had been experimented with earlier by Devraj Urs in the 1970s.

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