

14 The Modi factor in 2014¹

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Approaching the theme

The role of leadership in contributing to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) securing a clear majority in the 2014 Lok Sabha election has been the focus of much debate. Was the 2014 result a positive vote for a new leadership or a categorical expression of no confidence against the incumbent government? This chapter argues that leadership did play a vital role in ensuring the BJP's victory. However, the importance of the leadership factor needs to be contextualized. The strong feeling of discontent against the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in general and the Congress Party in particular appeared to play a vital role in contributing to the 'leadership' factor working to the decisive advantage of the BJP. This chapter attempts to assess the impact and importance of leadership in determining the decisive victory of the BJP and the decimating rout of the Congress Party.

There is today an emerging body of literature that examines the impact of a 'presidential'-style leadership race in elections held in traditionally parliamentary systems of government (King 1985, 2002; Kavanagh 1990, 2000; Bean 1993; Harmel and Svasand 1993; Hennessy 2000, 2007; Langer 2007, 2010; Richards 2009; Shastri 2009; Balmas and Shaefer 2010; Balmas *et al.* 2014). Studies have focused on how many successful electoral campaigns have been fashioned on a 'personal rather than a party reputation' (Carey and Shugart 1995). Studies of party and regime change have argued that 'new leaders' could often make the decisive difference (Harmel and Svasand 1993; Harmel *et al.* 1995). The 'prominent tone of the media' in projecting candidate attributes in an election and driving voter evaluation has been the focus of research (Balmas and Shaefer 2010). Studies have stressed that 'performance relevant qualities of competence and integrity' play a critical role in leadership-based electoral decisions in parliamentary systems (Bean 1993; Balmas *et al.* 2014). In the specific Indian context, it has been pointed out that cultural and

institutional factors could account for leadership playing a key role in influencing electoral outcomes (Chhibber and Verma 2014). The role of the leadership factor in defining and determining electoral outcomes has thus been the focus of considerable academic attention. This chapter draws on the relevant literature to assess the impact of leadership in the 2014 Lok Sabha election.

Providing a context

Over the last four general elections in India, the leadership factor has been central to the election campaign. The leaders of the two main alliances, the Congress and the BJP, have sought to gain the maximum political mileage from this factor, with, of course, distinctly different strategies and dramatically varying outcomes. In 1999, the NDA came to power using its prime ministerial candidate Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its election mascot (Shastri 2009). A repeat of the strategy in 2004 did help the BJP (and the NDA) garner votes, but the party and the alliance had to concede defeat and the Congress-led UPA formed the government. In the 2009 election, the BJP made every effort to make the 'leadership issue' the key driver of its election campaign by projecting its prime ministerial candidate L.K. Advani and attempting to paint the incumbent prime minister Manmohan Singh as being incompetent, weak and ineffective.² This strategy boomeranged badly as the Congress seized the opportunity to project Manmohan Singh as their prime ministerial candidate and in the process wrested the advantage.

The 2014 Lok Sabha election was held in the backdrop of the Congress-led UPA government completing a decade in power. After returning to power in 2009, UPA II was soon caught up in a range of controversies involving corruption charges against its ministers, a general policy paralysis in the government and a leadership (both in the government and in the party) that was clearly not able to inspire public confidence. As the 2014 election approached, the Congress in particular and the UPA in general seemed to be losing the initiative and conceding the advantage to the principal opposition, the BJP. A decisive turning point was the Gujarat assembly election in December 2012, when the BJP under the leadership of Narendra Modi returned to power for a fourth term. Many would believe that Modi's speech after the electoral victory was the first campaign speech for the 2014 Lok Sabha election. He departed from his normal practice of speaking in Gujarati and chose to reach out to a wider national audience in Hindi. Amidst chants of 'Modi for PM' by his supporters, he obliquely referred to a larger role by saying that the Gujarat result was a victory for 'those Indians, who aspire for prosperity and

development. This is a victory of all those who wish the country's good' (*The Hindustan Times*, 2012).

Soon the campaign for a larger national role for Modi gained momentum within the BJP. Sensing an opportunity to seize the initiative from the Congress Party, the BJP first appointed Modi as the chairman of its Campaign Committee for the 2014 Lok Sabha election in June 2013, close to a year before the election was due (*The Economic Times*, 2013), and went on to formally project him as its prime ministerial candidate in September 2013. His rise to this position was not without strong opposition from within the party, especially some of its key leaders.³ Given the support of the rank and file of the party and its frontal organizations, the BJP leadership appeared to have no choice but to appoint Modi as the prime ministerial candidate in spite of the reservations expressed by a few top BJP leaders. In the run-up to the 2014 election, the BJP clearly saw the electoral advantage of projecting a prime ministerial candidate when challenging a ruling UPA led by the Congress which was clearly on the back foot. The strong performance of the BJP in the state assembly elections held in December 2013⁴ further helped its cause. Reference has been made earlier to elections in parliamentary systems being skilfully converted into presidential-style leadership contests (King 2002; Langer 2010; Balmas *et al.* 2014). The BJP attempted something on these lines in the 2014 polls.

By declaring its prime ministerial candidate over six months prior to the elections, the BJP hoped to set the agenda for the elections and directly challenge the ruling Congress Party on the leadership issue. The Congress found itself in a dilemma as its incumbent prime minister no longer inspired confidence and the 'youth' face of the party. Rahul Gandhi appeared as a reluctant leader. While there was tremendous pressure on the Congress to declare Rahul Gandhi as the prime ministerial candidate, the party leadership was not willing, from its side, to formalize the electoral battle of 2014 as one between Rahul Gandhi and Narendra Modi. As late as February 2014, the Congress decided to name party president Sonia Gandhi as the chair of the Campaign Committee, with Rahul Gandhi, the party vice-president, being named the co-chair. Just prior to this, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also made a formal announcement that he was retiring at the end of his term as prime minister (Chhibber and Verma 2014). The Congress was thus in an unenviable position of entering the Lok Sabha election campaign with a retiring prime minister and a reluctant vice-president and co-chair of the Campaign Committee whose leadership skills and administrative acumen had still to be tested. This worked to the advantage of the BJP as it went into the election with a clear face – its prime ministerial candidate – while

the ruling Congress-led UPA was unable to project a face to lead its campaign.

It is important to record that it is rare in a parliamentary system for a ruling party to head into an election with a prime minister in retirement mode and no alternative leader being formally projected. In the recent past, in most parliamentary systems, if a prime minister planned to retire, this was often done much before the elections in order to give an opportunity to the new leader to demonstrate political capacities, establish credentials and lead the party in the next election campaign.⁵ Given the fact that the BJP had projected a prime ministerial candidate well in advance of the elections, the Congress found itself at a distinct disadvantage going to the polls with a retiring prime minister, who was not much visible in the campaign and a potential future leader (Rahul Gandhi) who was not yet formally declared as its prime ministerial candidate and looked far from eager to take on this responsibility. From the leadership perspective, it was a clear advantage for the BJP, even as the campaign for 2014 began. A state chief minister (Modi) emerging on the national scene and being projected as the prospective prime minister was reminiscent of 'new' leaders (Harmel *et al.* 1995) making a critical difference in electoral contests.

It is estimated that from the date of being declared as the prime ministerial candidate in September 2013 till the end of the campaign, Modi addressed 437 public rallies across 25 states covering 3 lakh kilometres besides 1,350 rallies through 3D technology (*The Times of India*, 2014). Unlike the past election campaigns of the BJP, this time around it was a one-man show, with all other prominent leaders of the party taking a back seat and playing second fiddle. It is interesting that the Congress leadership, which was often accused of promoting a high command culture, criticized the BJP in general and Modi in particular for running a 'one-man show'. Party vice-president Rahul Gandhi accused the BJP of believing in 'concentration of power in the hands of one person' (*Reuters*, 2014), which he felt was anti-democratic. It would be useful to keep in mind in this context that many successful electoral contests have revolved around the persona of an individual rather than the record of the party (Carey and Shugart 1995). The BJP campaign in 2014 was no different. The 2014 elections clearly saw a high-decibel campaign, with contrasting leadership strategies being followed by the two major players – the Congress and the BJP. The BJP leadership went on to be offensive against the Congress-led UPA and appeared to set the agenda,⁶ while the Congress appeared to be on the back foot, merely responding to the issues raised by the BJP prime ministerial candidate and focusing its attack on the leadership style and record of Narendra Modi.

The leadership factor and the 2014 elections

To test the impact of leadership in the 2014 campaign and electoral outcome, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)-Lokniti surveys (principally the National Election Study [NES]) conducted around the time of the 2014 election is analysed. A range of questions that specifically tapped the respondents' views on leadership are included for analysis.

Preferred prime ministerial choice

In the past three general elections, the National Election Study posed a question on who was the respondents' preferred choice for prime minister. In the 2014 Lok Sabha election, over one-third of the respondents mentioned Narendra Modi's name, and he had a 20 percentage point lead over the next most mentioned name – Rahul Gandhi. The two of them taken together were mentioned by half the respondents. In the 2009 election, the incumbent prime minister Manmohan Singh was mentioned by around one in every five respondents. The BJP prime ministerial candidate L.K. Advani was 3 percentage points behind. In 2004, the respondents clearly saw the contest between two leaders, with four of every ten supporting Vajpayee and three in every ten favouring Sonia Gandhi. It is important to record that the support for Modi in 2014 was a few percentage points below what Vajpayee secured a decade earlier (see Table 14.1). There is, of course, an important difference. Vajpayee was an incumbent prime minister, while Modi was an aspiring prime minister.

If one were to track the support enjoyed by Narendra Modi for prime ministership, the mention of his name by survey respondents increased noticeably after he was anointed chairman of the Campaign Committee and peaked after his nomination as the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP (see Table 14.1). It is also important to note that Modi maintained a clear 20 percentage point lead over Rahul Gandhi ever since he was declared the prime ministerial candidate and the Congress leader as the co-chair of the party Campaign Committee. The level of support for both Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi did not change in any significant measure in the months preceding the elections, clearly implying that the crystallization of popular opinion on the leadership issue was made well in advance of the elections.

It is also relevant to note that in 13 states of the country where the BJP did reasonably well, the support for Modi as prime minister was much higher than the national average. While the BJP-ruled states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat did figure in this list, the more critical states

Table 14.1 Preferred choice for prime minister – 2004–14

	April–May 2014 post-poll	March 2014	January 2014	July 2013	2011	2009 post-poll	2004 post-poll
Narendra Modi	36	34	34	19	5	2	–
Rahul Gandhi	14	15	15	12	19	6	1
Sonia Gandhi	3	3	5	5	10	16	29
Manmohan Singh	2	2	3	6	10	18	–
Atal Bihari Vajpayee	–	–	–	–	4	3	40
L.K. Advani	–	–	–	2	–	15	–

Notes: All figures are in percentage and rounded off. All names mentioned are not included. Weighted data.

Sources: Figures for 2004 are based on the National Election study conducted by Lokniti-CSDS post-poll study; for 2009, on the National Election Study conducted by Lokniti-CSDS post-poll study; for 2011, on the State of the Nation Survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS; for 2013, on Lokniti, CSDS-IBN National Tracker Poll – round one conducted in July 2013; for January 2014, on Lokniti, CSDS-IBN National Tracker Poll conducted in January 2014; for March 2014, on Lokniti-CSDS-IBN National Pre-Poll conducted in March 2014; and for 2014, post-poll based on Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study.

Sample size for post-poll 2014 is 22,300; March 2014 – 20,957; January 2014 – 18,591; 2013 – 19,062; 2011 – 20,854; 2009 – 36,629; 2004 – 27,189.

Question asked: Who would you prefer as the prime minister of the country, after the next Lok Sabha election?

No names or choices were offered to the respondents for this question. The question was open ended.

Wherever no figure is entered against a leader's name, it indicates a negligible percentage below 0.5 per cent.

like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, where the party did exceptionally well, also endorsed the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP in large numbers (see Figure 14.1).

Did the support for Modi vary across different socio-economic groups? It is noticed that among the socially and economically privileged, the support for Modi was significantly higher⁷ (see Figure 14.2). More than half of those from the upper castes preferred Modi as prime minister. The support declines when one is to look at the preferences of the Dalits and Muslims. Similarly, the upper and middle classes were more likely to have opted for Modi as compared to the poor and lower classes. Half of those with high media exposure favoured Modi, and as media exposure declined, support for Modi also fell. If the age differential were considered, first-time voters were prominent in backing Modi, and this




Figure 14.1 States where the support for Narendra Modi as prime minister was high

Notes: All figures are in percentage and rounded off. Weighted data.

Source: Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study; n = 22,300.

Question asked: Who would you prefer as the prime minister of the country, after the next Lok Sabha election?

No names or choices were offered to the respondents for this question. The question was open ended.

intensity reduces as one moves to the older age groups. The support for Modi was the strongest in central and western India (where incidentally the party did very well) and much lower in south and east India (where the party performance was less impressive). Thus, the intensity of support for Modi appears to be directly linked with the support that the party enjoyed across regions, socio-economic groups and different age groups. There clearly appears to be a social funnel of support for Modi as prime minister. The more affluent, those with access to education, those socially more privileged and those with greater media exposure were more likely to prefer Modi for prime ministership. As one moves lower in the socio-economic order, the support for Modi tends to become more lukewarm.⁸

The impact of the leadership factor can also be assessed by looking at the support for Modi as prime minister in different types of electoral/party contests. For this purpose, we grouped the states of India into three categories, namely BJP-ruled states,⁹ BJP strong-presence states¹⁰ and BJP weak-presence states. We notice that the level of support for Modi as prime minister varies significantly across these three categories of states.




Figure 14.2 Predicted probability – preference for Modi as prime minister

Source: Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study; $n = 22,300$.

Question asked: Who would you prefer as the prime minister of the country, after the next Lok Sabha election?

No names or choices were offered to the respondents for this question. The question was open ended.

If support for Modi and other non-BJP leaders as prime minister is considered,¹¹ four of every ten supported Modi in states where the BJP had a strong presence but was not in power. This rises by 4 percentage points in BJP-ruled states. In BJP-weak states, it plummets to 15 per cent. This implies that the support for Modi as against other non-BJP leaders for prime minister was marginally higher in BJP-ruled states as compared to BJP strong-presence states and clearly lower in BJP weak-presence states. The high reference to Modi in BJP-ruled states could also be seen as a function of the presence of the party in these states as a ruling party. It could also be linked to the public perception of the performance of the BJP government in these states. Modi, in the case of states where the BJP was in power, could have been riding on the shoulders of popular BJP chief ministers in the states (see Table 14.2).

Table 14.2 Preferred prime minister choice: Modi versus other non-BJP leaders

Prime minister choice	BJP-ruled states	BJP strong-presence states	BJP weak-presence states
Narendra Modi	46	41	15
Other non-BJP leaders	32	34	38
Do not know	22	25	48

$n = 21,727$.

Source: Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study.

Leadership qualities and their influence

Studies in parliamentary systems have focused on the importance of leadership qualities like competence and integrity in influencing electoral decisions (Bean 1993; Balmas *et al.* 2014). National Election Survey 2014 had a battery of questions, which sought responses on which leader in the current elections came to respondents' mind when thinking of being caring, trustworthy/reliable, capable of getting things done, took other leaders along and was experienced. Narendra Modi scored the highest on all indicators and had a minimum 25 percentage point lead over the second name mentioned – Rahul Gandhi (see Figure 14.3).

How did the voters rate political parties in terms of their leadership? When asked as to which party had a good leadership, over seven of the ten who voted for the BJP endorsed the party as the best for leadership. When it came to the Congress, those who voted for the party were not as confident of the leadership capacities of those in the party.

It is also relevant to underscore the fact that the unhappiness with the performance of the UPA II government on key indicators, including employment opportunities, safety of women and uninterrupted power supply, could have swayed support away from the leadership of the ruling party to the BJP prime ministerial candidate.¹²

Did the declaration of prime ministerial candidate by the BJP impact on the results?

If Modi were not to be the BJP prime ministerial candidate, would the voting preference have varied? This question was posed as part of the National Election Survey 2014. Close to one-fourth said that their vote preference would have changed if Modi were not the prime ministerial nominee of the BJP. In the case of those who voted for the BJP, close to




Figure 14.3 Leadership qualities: support for Narendra Modi

Note: Figures are in percentage and rounded off. Weighed data.

Source: Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study.

No names or choices were offered to the respondents for this question. The question was open ended.

three in every ten said that their voting preference would have changed. In states where the BJP was the ruling party, this percentage dropped marginally, and in states where the BJP had a strong presence but was not in power, it increased by 2 percentage points. It is important to highlight that in states where the BJP had a weak presence, close to three of every ten of those who voted for the BJP said that they would have altered their choice if Modi was not the prime ministerial candidate.

The implication is important. A much higher percentage of BJP voters in states where it had a weak presence and where it had a strong presence but was not in power stated that they would not have voted for the BJP if Modi was not the party's prime ministerial candidate as compared to the trend in BJP-ruled states. A higher percentage of BJP supporters would continue to vote for the BJP in states where it was in power even if Modi were not the prime ministerial candidate. The real difference of Modi's candidature seems to be in states where it had a strong presence but was not in power and those states where it had a weak presence.

The impact of the Modi factor in states where it was not in power can also be discerned when an analysis is made state-wise. In many states, a much higher percentage of those who voted for the BJP stated that they would have changed their voting preference if Modi was not the prime

Table 14.3 If Modi were not to be the prime ministerial candidate, would you have changed your voting preference?

	Overall	Voted for BJP			
		Overall	BJP-ruled states	BJP strong-presence states	BJP weak-presence states
Would have voted for some other party	22	28	25	30	29
Made no difference	49	51	53	50	40
Do not know	29	21	22	20	30

Note: All figures are in percentage and rounded off. Weighed data.

n = 19,752.

Source: Lokniti-CSDS-IBN NES 2014 post-poll study.

ministerial candidate. This includes states like Bihar, Karnataka, Assam, Haryana and Delhi where the party did well. In Karnataka, six of every ten of those who voted for the BJP stated that if Narendra Modi was not the prime ministerial candidate, they would have changed their party choice. In Bihar and Rajasthan, four of every ten respondents took this stand. Even in states like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal where the BJP did expand its presence, a significant chunk (higher than the national average) of those who voted for the BJP stated that if Modi was not the candidate for prime ministership, their party choice would have been different. In some key battle ground states, the projection of Modi as the prime ministerial candidate worked to the advantage of the party and contributed to its victory. However, the picture in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is different. Here even if Modi were not the prime ministerial candidate, the support for the BJP would seem high. In Uttar Pradesh, over three-fourths and in Maharashtra over two-thirds, of those who said that they would vote for the BJP, said that Modi not being the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP would make no difference to who they voted for. Given the organizational base of the BJP (and its allies) in these two states, the Modi factor seems to have had only an incremental effect (see Table 14.3).

How critical was leadership?

To understand which factor drove voter choice, a regression analysis was undertaken of all the factors discussed earlier: (a) preference for Modi as prime minister; (b) leadership skills; (c) prime minister choice in BJP-ruled states; (d)

prime minister choice in BJP strong-presence states; (e) which party is better for good leadership; and (f) if Modi were not to be the prime ministerial candidate, would people have voted for some other party? (See Table 14.4.)

The regression analysis permits an assessment of each of the aforementioned variables while controlling for all the others. For the variable 'preference of Narendra Modi as PM candidate', the regression table shows that respondents who preferred Narendra Modi as PM candidate (with reference to other non-BJP candidates) tended to vote for the BJP. This, of course, is on expected lines. The leadership index variable is positive and significant, which shows that respondents who viewed Modi as a leader who is caring, reliable, efficient, inclusive and experienced tended to vote for the BJP. With respect to the BJP-ruled states, BJP strong-presence states and BJP weak-presence states,¹³ while controlling for all other variables, in BJP-ruled states (with reference to other states) the respondents tended to vote for the BJP. While controlling for all other variables, in states where the BJP has a strong presence but is not in power (with reference to states where it was weak), the respondents also tended to vote for the BJP but are less likely to vote for it than those in the BJP-ruled states. Both these variables show a significant result in the regression.

While analysing which party is better in terms of providing good leadership (BJP is better, Congress is better, some other party is better),¹⁴ respondents who felt the BJP was better at providing good leadership (with reference to other parties) tended to vote for the BJP. However, it is important to note that one does not get a significant result for the respondents who say that the Congress was better at providing a good leadership (with reference to other parties). The coefficient value for the last variable is negative, which shows that had Narendra Modi not been

Table 14.4 Regression analysis for vote for BJP with leadership variables and states

Variables	Coefficients	Standard error
Constant	0.108*	0.017
V1 – preference for PM candidate	0.246*	0.012
V2 – leadership index	0.027*	0.001
V3 – BJP-ruled states	0.129*	0.015
V3 – BJP strong presence in states	0.047*	0.013
V4 – BJP is better for good leadership	0.347*	0.011
V4 – Congress is better for good leadership	–0.015	0.011
V5 – not voting for the BJP if Modi was not the candidate	–0.020**	0.008

Notes: Dependent variable – vote for the BJP. Reference variable for V3 – 'other states'. Reference variable for V4 – 'other parties'. *p value < 0.01, **p value < 0.05.

Source: Regression model run by authors using data from NES 2014 post-poll.

projected as the prime ministerial candidate, the respondents were more likely to have voted for some other party.

The regression table shows that the most significant variable appears to be the one that talks of the BJP as the preferred party for its good leadership followed by the preferred prime ministerial candidate.

Conclusion

The BJP's strategy of declaring its prime ministerial candidate several months before the elections were scheduled did provide the party an advantage over its principal rival, the Congress Party. The BJP consciously crafted its entire electoral campaign around the personality of its prime ministerial candidate. The data as outlined in the chapter clearly show that the leadership factor did play a role, but there is no conclusive evidence to prove that it was the decisive factor. Yet it must also be asserted that the success achieved by the BJP in projecting its leadership was also linked to the dismal failure and lacklustre performance of the party that it was challenging.¹⁵ A UPA II on the defensive and a Congress leadership that proved ineffective and directionless added further sheen to the BJP's projection of its leadership as decisive, effective and experienced. Much of what is seen as shining is often contextual. When what was ranged against the BJP was seen to be lacklustre and hopelessly wanting in competence and capacity, the BJP appeared to score important points not exclusively for what it and its leadership represented but what it was pitted against. The BJP's victory had much to do with a well-planned leader-driven campaign. It had also a lot to do with an uninspiring and ineffective ruling coalition and leadership that was ranged against it.

Notes

- 1 In preparing this chapter we received inputs and support from many colleagues from within the Lokniti network. We would like to thank Pradeep Chhibber and Rahul Verma for their valuable inputs. Different segments of this chapter were discussed at length with K.C. Suri, Suhas Palshikar, Sanjay Kumar and Sanjay Lodha. We thank them for their patience and suggestions, and to the entire Lokniti network for their support. While acknowledging these contributions, we would like to take full responsibility for the analysis contained in this chapter. This is a revised version of the paper published in the *Economic and Political Weekly*.
- 2 The BJP's election manifesto opens with the statement: 'Determined Leader and Decisive Government'. The focus on leadership was patently visible in the party's campaign strategy (Shastri 2009).
- 3 The senior most BJP leader and its prime ministerial candidate in the 2009 election, L.K. Advani, openly expressed his opposition to the decision of the BJP, both when Modi was made chairman of the Campaign Committee and when Modi was declared as the prime ministerial candidate of the party. Advani refused to attend the meeting of the National Executive of the BJP at Goa, at which Modi was declared as the chairman of the Campaign Committee, and resigned from all main forums of the party, as he was not able to 'reconcile either with the

- current functioning of the party or the direction in which it is going' (*The Times of India*, 11 June 2013). While he later withdrew his resignation, he continued to express his reservations on the lack of collective leadership in the party and refused to attend the meeting of the Party Parliamentary Board that declared Modi as the prime ministerial candidate. Advani became the main symbol of the dissent within the party and was supported by some of the other top leaders in the party, including Sushma Swaraj, Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha.
- 4 Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Delhi and Mizoram went to the polls, and the BJP won in the first three states and emerged as the single-largest party in Delhi. Mizoram was the only state the Congress was able to retain. These were the last major elections before the 2014 Lok Sabha polls.
 - 5 Examples from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand can be quoted in this regard.
 - 6 In one of his last appeals, at the fag end of the campaign, Modi urged voters to 'throw out the scandal-plagued Congress party from power' (*The Hindustan Times*, 12 May 2014).
 - 7 This is in consonance with the nature of support enjoyed by the BJP in the 2014 election where the socially and economically privileged supported it more than those economically less privileged and the lower castes.
 - 8 It is important to record that this trend is also true in the case of the support for the BJP, as seen in the National Election Study 2014 analysis.
 - 9 Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan (Punjab is included as the BJP is in power with an ally).
 - 10 Andhra Pradesh (excluding Telangana), Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Jharkhand, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
 - 11 This implies those who opted for a BJP leader other than Modi (which was marginal) are not included in the analysis.
 - 12 Close to four of every ten respondents felt that employment opportunities and safety of women deteriorated during the UPA II period, and another four of every ten felt that the situation remained the same.
 - 13 Dummy variables were created for each of these categories and included in the analysis. The two dummy variables included in the analysis are 'BJP-ruled states' and 'BJP-presence states'. The reference category is 'other states' (which are neither ruled by the BJP nor have a strong BJP presence).
 - 14 Similar to the previous variable, dummy variables for all three categories were created and included in the regression.
 - 15 The comment by the RSS chief that the BJP victory was because 'people wanted the change during the elections' (*The Free Press Journal*, 12 August 2014) assumes significance in this context.
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