

6

Democracy as Global Entitlement

A Cross-National Analysis of Citizen Perception of Democracy

Sandeep Shastri

Despite our differences in background and culture, we came together in the spirit of shared democratic values, and with a recognition of the importance of building a worldwide network of democrats committed to mutual support, exchange and cooperation. Democracy in today's changing world means pluralism; identity and geography are no longer synonymous, and 'majority rule' must give way to power sharing in societies with a multiplicity of ethnic, religious, racial and socio-economic groups. Conflict resolution addresses the needs of pluralism; it can be a slow process, but it helps ensure equal rights, a fundamental principle of democracy.

Steering Committee of the Second Assembly of World Movement for Democracy — Confronting the Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century held at Sao Paulo, Brazil from 12 to 15 November 2000.

I

The 'democracy revolution' and its multi-track implications has been central to the analysis of the dynamics of modern political systems in particular and the course and direction of contemporary politics in general. Several recent studies have focussed attention on the 'capacity

building' potential of democracy and its attendant institutions and processes, in a wide range of social, economic, political, cultural and historical contexts. The discourse on 'expanding the democratic space' has been the focal point of governance reform, strategies for meaningful citizen participation, sensitising society (and the state structures) to human rights concerns, celebrating diversity, peace building and conflict resolution.

Here, the focus is on the impact and implications of democracy and its institutions on the process of entitlement. Entitlement has often been described as 'conferring a legal right to' or 'qualifying for something'. More specifically, the analytical framework adopted by this article to dialogue on the finer nuances of 'entitlement' is essentially the 'view from the ground'—the citizen perspective. It attempts a preliminary analysis of the data generated by the World Values Survey¹. It is divided into three sections. In the first section, the framework for comparative democracy analysis is outlined. In the second section, the survey data on select questions—relevant to the theme, is discussed. In the final section, the data from the India component of the study is assessed.

A comparative assessment of the working of democratic systems the world over has been attempted by several scholars. After Lipset's analysis of the linkages between democracy and economic development (Lipset 1960), several studies have followed the 'quantitative analysis' route for comparative democracy assessment (see Arat 1999). Vanhanen's quantitative analysis of democratic political systems assumed significance in this context as he attempted an assessment of the process of democratisation in 147 societies (Vanhanen 1990). In this study, he develops the 'Darwinian or evolutionary theory of democracy', wherein he stresses the inevitable and universal evolution of all political systems into democracies. He updated the study by including another 25 societies and examined the future prospects of democracy. In the second work, democracy was viewed as 'a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutionalised power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people' (Vanhanen 1997:31 emphasis added). He measured democracy on the basis of two indicators: competition and participation and argued that the measure adopted were objective and permitted a realistic

assessment of the nature and status of democracy in different countries. However, the methodology adopted by Vanhanen appears to favour affluent western democracies as against third world and newly emerging democratic polities, as his analysis leads to the conclusion that 'at a given point of time more developed countries will appear to be more democratic (Arat 1999). Vanhanen's analysis needs to be more responsive to new interpretations that take into account the ground reality in third world democracies.

Dahl's treatment of democratic political systems comes close to the 'entitlement' dimension of democracy, when he stresses on the 'logic of equality' which implies that individuals view themselves as being well equipped to have a say in the governing of the group (Dahl 1998). This 'fact of equality' can be measured, in Dahl's view, by means of five criteria:

- 1) effective participation in politics,
- 2) voting equality;
- 3) control of the agenda;
- 4) inclusion of adults; and
- 5) enlightened understanding.

Dahl further argues that the principle of political equality is operationalised through six critical institutions:

- a) elected representatives;
- b) full, fair and frequent elections;
- c) freedom of expression;
- d) availability of alternative information;
- e) associational autonomy; and
- f) inclusive citizenship.

Dahl concludes his argument by stressing on five important conditions that consolidate the democratic process and permit democratic deepening—

- i) civil control of military;
- ii) democratic beliefs and political culture;
- iii) independence from foreign domination;

- iv) market economy;
- v) weak subcultural pluralism.

Dahl's analysis does not take into account the potential for conflict among the various criteria and the unintended 'undemocratic' consequences they may produce. Dahl's arguments point to the direction of 'entitlement' in democracies but does not engage in the fine tuning of the debate.

Several studies have focussed on the process of democratisation especially in the light of the 'third wave of democracy' (Huntington 1991 also O'Donnel *et al.* 1986). While discussing the problems of transition and consolidation in 'new democracies', Diamond assesses the 'norms' and 'behaviour' dimensions of democratic consolidation from the perspective of the top elites, intermediary agents and the public. He asserts that if the three should demonstrate 'substantial normative commitment to democracy and behavioural compliance with its rule and limits, democracy is consolidated (Diamond 1999).

Linz and Stephan (1996) examine democratic consolidation from the perspective of the behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional aspects and emphasise on the need for 'crafting a consolidation in each country-case' and making qualitative judgments about the direction of the change on each of the three dimensions' (Power 2000). Literature on democratic politics in post-Communist societies have focussed on two distinctive issues – the role of 'elite bargaining and institutional crafting in shaping the transition process' and the 'importance of the legacy of the old communist regime in influencing political developments in post-communist societies (Dawson 1999; also see White *et al.* 1993). Rose *et al.* in their study of post-communist societies have opined that in the process of consolidation of democratic politics, the baggage of history—as handed down by the erstwhile communist regime, often plays a major role (Rose *et al.* 1998). The transition to democracy is often not because it is 'the only game in town' but on the basis of how citizens judge democracy against the other 'potential alternatives that the government may supply' (Dawson 1999). Examining democratic transition in Russia, Solnick observes that the 'pernicious institutional consolidation that has taken place behind the banner of democratisation' lies at the root of the crisis of democratic consolidation (Solnick 1999). In a similar vein, Przeworski

argues that the 'very conditions that make democracy possible in the first place, may prove corrosive to its long-term institutionalisation' (Przeworski as quoted in Solnick 1999).

The process of democratic engineering in India and the efforts to expand the democratic space have occupied the spotlight of attention in any analysis of democracy in particular and Indian politics in general. In recent years, survey research has provided a window of opportunity to assess the multi-track factors that have contributed to the ushering in of a new phase of competitive democratic politics across the country. This 'new politics' has witnessed the Indian citizen asserting her 'entitlement' in newer and more significant ways.

A wide range of social and political developments have, on the one hand been shaped by the changing power equations within the political system and have also influenced the nature, course and direction of democratic politics, on the other. The impact of social change on the working of the political process and institutions, the more 'inclusive' nature of electoral politics and participation, the end of one party domination and the emergence of a competitive party system, the reality of coalition politics, are all a reflection of this trend.

The political developments of the 1990s have clearly contributed to 'the federalizing of democracy and the empowering of the Indian citizen' (Shastri 1999). A linked development is the more inclusive nature of Indian politics with the 'electoral political arena (in the '1990s)... witnessing greater participation and more intense politicisation than before' (Yadav 1999:2317). Its political implications are far reaching and central to the democratic theory debate in the country. These are examined at length in the third section.


II

To estimate the attitude of the citizens to issues of democracy and democratic institutions, an attempt is made to analyse the World Values Survey data. The fourth wave of the study (1999-02) has been completed and here, data from 64 countries² has been included for the purpose of analysis.

When asked to evaluate democracy as a way of governing the country, an overwhelming majority in all systems were supportive of the same. Overall, a little over 90 % of the respondents felt that having a democratic

political system was very good/good. The percentage of positive response was marginally higher in developed countries—92.1% and closer to the overall average in developing countries and below the world average in post-communist polities—88% (see Figure 1). In most of the advanced industrial democracies of mainland Europe, the support for a democratic political system was well above 95%. Significantly high support for democracy (95%+) was also observed in the newly emerging democracies which had experienced long years of military rule/dictatorship (Nigeria, Uganda and Bangladesh). There were very few examples for among the post-Communist polities where the support for a democratic political system exceeded 90%.


Figure 1
Having a Democratic Political System



The differences in citizen perception across democracies became apparent when they were asked to evaluate the working of democracy in their country. Overall, more than half the respondents were very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the working of democracy in their country. In developed countries, the percentage of those who were positive about the working of democracy was nearly 60 %. It is interesting to note that the percentage of those very satisfied with democracy was much higher in developing countries than developed countries. However, it must be recorded that significant variation was reported in the responses across developing countries and the standard deviation for the same is thus very high (18.2).

It is relevant to note that the 'very satisfied' assertion was significantly high in a few developing countries which were transitioning to democracy after long years of military rule/dictatorship/apartheid (Nigeria, Indonesia and South Africa). This has accounted for the relatively high percentage of 'very satisfied' responses and the high standard deviation. In several democracies in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Mexico), there was a relatively higher degree of disenchantment with the working of the democratic political system. In post-communist polities too, the enthusiasm about the working of the democratic system was not very high. In fact, one of every five respondents recorded that they were not at all satisfied with the way democracy was functioning in their country (see Figure 2).


Figure 2
Democracy as it is Developing in Your Country



The respondents were asked to evaluate the working of their economic system in the context of the democratic process. Only one-third of the respondents felt that the economic system functioned badly in a democracy. The percentage of those dissatisfied with the functioning of the economic system in their democracy was higher in developing countries – more than 40%. However, there were significant variations across developing countries and this can be discerned from the high STD for the response Agree Strongly (20) and Agree (12.1). In post-communist polities too, nearly 38% of the

respondents were unhappy with the functioning of the economic system (see Figure 3). A comparatively small percentage of respondents in these systems, strongly endorsed democracy as the ideal shell for the operation of the economy (less than 10%).

Figure 3
In a Democracy, the Economic System Functions Badly




More than half the respondents opined that democracies were indecisive and witnessed frequent squabbles (see Figure 4). In developing countries and post-communist polities, a higher percentage of respondents endorsed this view (52%). However, there was significant variation in the nature of response across developing countries for all four categories of answers (Agree Strongly, Agree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly), as is evidenced from the high STD.

On whether democracies were good at maintaining order, there was a sharp variation in the citizens response, across political systems. In developing countries, one of every four citizens felt that democracy did not have the necessary competence to maintain order (see Figure 5). Their number rose to one-third in developing countries and to 40% in post-communist polities. The high STD for all four categories

of answers in developing countries indicates that there is tremendous variation in the nature of response across developing countries.

Figure 4
Democracies are Indecisive



The lack of faith in the capacity of a democracy to maintain order was exceptionally high in a few developing countries (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, Nigeria and Indonesia), while in most other developing countries the percentage of those dissatisfied was in the 20-25 % range. Citizens in the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe were more cynical of the capacity of their democratic systems to maintain order as compared to those in the former Soviet republics.

The response of the citizens to the democracy question from the 'TINA' (There is no alternative) factor evoked a response similar to the question on the endorsement on democracy (Figure 1). When respondents were asked whether they believed that in spite of all its problems, democracy was superior to its alternatives, nearly 90 % agreed or strongly agreed. The percentage of endorsement was slightly higher in developed countries, closer to the world average in developing countries and marginally lower in post-communist polities. In the developing countries in Latin America, the endorsement of

democracy with all its limitations, was significantly lower. The same trend was seen in the post Communist polities of Eastern Europe.

Figure 5
Democracies are not Good at Maintaining Order





Figure 6
Democracy may have its Problems but it is Better than any Other System



An in-depth study of the response of citizens in developing countries is attempted in the next section by taking India as a case study.

With regard to the post-communist polities, the trends outlined in


the previous section appears to have been empirically proved by the World Values Survey data. Przeworski had rightly asserted that one of the paradoxes of democratic transition that 'extrication from authoritarianism' requires 'cooperation between precisely those groups (opposition moderates and either regime reformers or opposition radicals) who will later compete for power under the new democratic rules' (Przeworski 1988; 1991). As a result the transition to democracy often becomes 'stuck' and democracy remains 'unconsolidated' or the 'transition may never have happened' in the first place (Solnick 1999).

III

The survey data emerging from the Indian segment of the World Values Survey sheds more light on the attitude of the Indian citizen to the wider issues that have shaped the course and direction of Indian democracy in general and the dynamics of politics in particular³.

The support for maintaining and further stabilising a vibrant democratic political system was clearly apparent in the stand of the respondents, when asked to evaluate democracy as a way of governing the country. More than half the respondent who took a stand on the issue, opined that a democratic political system was very good while another 41 % felt that it was a fairly good political arrangement. Only 7 % of the respondents had misgivings about the effectiveness of democracy as a form of political organisation (Figure 7).

Figure 7
Having a Democratic Political System




The overwhelming support for democracy was consistently evident

across diverse social and economic groups and every region of the country. The efforts in the recent past, to expand the democratic space in India, appears to have had a major impact on citizens confidence in the democratic process.

While citizens across the country have unequivocally endorsed the need for a democratic political system, major differences exist among different social groups on how they view the working of political institutions and processes over the years. When asked to compare the political system with how it was ten years ago, it is noticed that a significant number of respondents across age groups preferred to adopt the line of least resistance and stated that they felt the conditions were just about the same. The level of dissatisfaction among those in the 41-50 age group was significantly higher as compared to the other age groups (Figure 8). The higher level of dissatisfaction with regard to the working of the political system today as compared to ten years ago, in this age group can be explained in terms of the fact that this was a generation that grew up in India during the years immediately after Independence and were deeply influenced by the idealism and high level of expectations that was generated in the euphoria of freedom and self-rule. With the achievements falling far short of the promise, disillusionment with the functioning of the political system was a natural corollary.


Figure 8
Political System as Compared to Ten Years Ago
Response Across Age Groups



It is also important to note that there are significant variations in the attitude of citizens towards the political system today as compared to ten years ago, depending on the education level. Among those, who view the political system of today as being much better off than what it was ten years ago, there are more likely to be those who are illiterate and have had little formal education as compared to those who have had the benefit of higher education (See Figure 9). Conversely, the cynicism about the working of the political system increases as the level of education of the respondent improves.

Figure 9

Political System as Compared to Ten Years Ago and Education
Level: Response Across Education Levels




When viewed in terms of the response of different social groups⁴, the political system as it has developed today, is endorsed more by the backward castes and the Scheduled Castes as compared to the forward castes. It is also interesting to note that in the case of all the groups save, the scheduled castes, a majority of the respondents who expressed an opinion on the subject opined that the political system today is just the same as it was ten years ago. A significantly larger number from among the Scheduled Castes have taken a clear stand of either being appreciative or critical of the present political system, resulting in a clear three way split of the opinion of Scheduled Castes on the issue. (Figure 10).

Studies in the past too, have drawn attention to similar trends. The CSDS Survey in 1967 had posed the question to voters in India as to whether their vote made a difference. 48% stated that their vote made a difference. In 1998 when the same question was posed as part of the National Election Study, as many as 59 % responded that their vote mattered (Yadav 1996). The study also found that among the marginalized social groups there is a significant rise in their 'sense of efficacy' and they are involved today in more 'active forms of political participation' (Yadav 1999 :2397 also see Mitra and Singh 1999; Palshikar and Deshpande 1999; Shastri 1999c; Heath 1999). The nation has also been witness to the trend of those higher in the social hierarchy demonstrating greater cynicism about the political process, while the socially and educationally underprivileged expressing greater support and commitment to it. Indian democracy has witnessed a participatory upsurge, especially among the hitherto marginalized social groups and the survey data too provides evidence of this trend.

Figure 10

Political System Today as Compared to how it was Ten Years Ago
Response Across Caste Groups



The interface between the political and economic system has been a subject of intense debate in India, with the government adopting a New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1990s, focussing on macro-


economic stabilisation and structural adjustment. In the last few years the government has been focussing on implementing a 'second generation' of economic reforms. The political context in which the liberalisation project has been carried forward merits detailed scrutiny, as economic reforms is as much political as it is economic (Raghavulu 1997; Shastri 1997; Shastri 2001b). In the first place, the 1991 initiative was taken by a minority government and economic reforms had not been discussed in any serious way in the 1991 election campaign. Those who played a major role in introducing the reforms, today concede the fact that the fiscal crisis (of 1991) triggered off the launching of economic reforms. Commitments were made to international funding agencies without any significant public debate or even discussion in Parliament on the issue (Haider 1996, Ghosh 1996). The entire exercise appeared to have been undertaken in an 'autocratic manner' largely guided by considerations of political expedience' (Haider 1996:18). The legitimacy of the entire reform package came to be challenged on this ground (Reddy 1997:106). It must also be stressed that a major reforms initiative that has important implications for the country must be based on popular consent. In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the ruling Congress party made no serious attempt to draw the attention of the people to the new economic policy. Even while focussing on development with stability, the Congress election campaign had a 'vaguely defined leftist stance (and) no alternate economic philosophy (was) publically articulated' (Chowdhury 1996). The National Election Study '96, in its nationwide survey of citizen attitudes, found that only 20% of the respondents had heard of economic reforms. Of them only 50% approved of the same. It is significant that more than 90% of the respondents had either not heard of the reforms or-disapproved of the same (Yadav 1996:48).

Further, it has been asserted in several quarters, that given the manner in which economic reforms have been implemented, the benefits have largely gone in favour of the 'economically, socially, politically, physically, educationally and culturally' (Haider 1996:20-21) better equipped. In this context, the citizen response to the working of the economic system in the political shell of democracy assumes significance. Among those who took a stand on the issue, a majority disagreed with the view that the fact of democracy was detrimental to the functioning of the economic system.

However, a deeper analysis of the response of those from different


educational backgrounds reveals that the less educated were more critical of how the economic system functioned in a democracy as compared to those who have the benefit of higher education. More than 55% of the illiterate respondents have reservations about the functioning of the economic system in a democracy. The frustration with the capacity of a democracy to run an effective economic system was significant also among those who did not complete their schooling.

Figure 11
In a Democracy the Economic System Runs Badly




It is also relevant to note that a large number from among the backward castes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were apprehensive about the capacity of a democratic system to manage

Figure 12
In a Democracy the Economic System Functions Badly:
Response Across Educational Levels



the economy effectively. This could be linked to the fact that their experience has shown that the benefits of economic development in a democracy like India, has not percolated to the socially disadvantaged sections of society.

Figure 13
In a Democracy the Economic System Runs Badly:
Response Across Castes



The World Values Survey data provides empirical proof to explain major developments in the democratisation process both in India in particular and in the world in general. It mirrors the multi-verse of democracy, the wide range of options to ensure democratic engineering, the changing landscape of democracy the world over and permits a realistic and meaningful assessment of the citizen's perspective on matters linked to democracy, democratic institutions and democratic entitlement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arat, Zebra F. 1999. Prospects of Democracy : A Study *American Political Science Review*. September.
- Arora, Balveer and dD.Verney. (eds) 1995. *Multiple Identities in a Single State*. New Delhi : Konark.
- Chatterjee, Partha. (ed) 1997. *States and Politics in India*. New Delhi : Oxford.
- Dahl, Robert. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dawson, Jane. 1999. Democracy and its Alternatives Understanding Post-Communist Societies. *Europe-Asia Studies*. July.
- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy : Towards Consolidation*. Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry, and Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset. 1989. *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 4 vols. Boulder : Lynner Rienner.
- Fishkin, James.S. 1999. On Democracy. *American Political Science Review*. September.
- Ghosh, Arun. 1996. Role of Planning in a Globalised Economy. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 32:35-37:2255-59.
- Haider, Saraswati. 1996. Human Development and the New Economic Policy in India. *Mainstream*: 39:40:17-25.
- Heath, Oliver. 1999. Anatomy of BJP's Rise to Power. *Economic and Political Weekly* 34:34-35.
- Held.D.1987. *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge : Polity.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. Democratisation : The Third Wave. *Journal of Democracy* 2:1.
- and J. Nelson. 1976. No Easy Choices: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. *The Silent Revolution : Changing Values and Political Styles in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton : Princeton University Press.
- 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton : Princeton University Press.
- 1997. *Modernization and Post modernization : Cultural, Economic and Political Changes in 43 Societies*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press.
- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stephan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man*. New York : Basic Books.
- Kohli, Atul (ed). 2001. *The Success of India's Democracy*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Mitra, Subrata and V.B. Singh. 1999. *Democracy and Social Change in India*. New Delhi :Sage.
- O'Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: John Hopkins.

- Palshikar, Suhas and R. Deshpande. 1999. Electoral Competition and Structures of Domination in Maharashtra. *Economic and Political Weekly* 34-35:2409-2422.
- Power, Timothy.J. 2000. Developing Democracy : Towards Consolidation. American Political Science review. September.
- Pzeworski, Adam. 1988. Democracy as a Contingent of Conflicts. In *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, in Pzeworski et. al. (ed)
- 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Adam and Stagstad Rune (eds). 1988. *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Raghavulu, C.V. 1996. Privatisation and Public Enterprises in India: Issues of Policy and Implementation. *Indian Journal of Public Administration*. 42:3.
- Reddy, Rammanohar.C. 1997. 1947-1997: The Balance Sheet. in Ravi N.(ed):103-07.
- Rose, Richard., William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. *Democracy and Its Alternatives*. Cambridge : Polity.
- Schaffer, Frederic.C. 1998. *Democracy in Transition : Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press.
- Schmitter, and Terry Karl. 1991. 'What Democracy Is And Is Not'. *Journal of Democracy*. Summer 1991.
- Shastri, Sandeep. 1997. Economic Liberalisation and Administrative Reforms. *Southern Economist*, 36-19-5-9.
- 2001a. 'Changing Contours of Comparative Federalism : Understanding the Indian Experience'. Paper Presented at a Seminar Organised by the Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies (PEFS), Ibadan, 4 September 2001.
- 2001b. Good Governance and Economic Liberalisation'. Paper Presented at a Seminar organised by the International Political Science Association's Research Committee no 4 at Abuja from 15 to 17 October 2001.
- 2001c. Citizen Confidence in Political Institutions and Processes in India : A Study of the role of Regional, Social and Economic Factors. Paper Presented at a Conference on the World Values Survey held at Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 17-21 November.
- Solnick, Steven L. 1999. Russia Transition : Is Democracy Delayed Democracy Denies. *Social Research*. Fall.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. *The Process of Democratization : A Comparative Study of 147-States*. New York : Crane Russak.
- 1997. *Prospects of Democracy : A Study of 172 Countries*. New York : Routledge.
- White, Stephen, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider. 1993. *The Politics of Transition : Shaping a post-Soviet Future*. Cambridge : Cambridge University press.
- Yadav, Yogendra. 1996. 'Reconfiguration in Indian Politics'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 31:2-3.
- 1999. Electoral Politics in the Time of Change. *Economic and Political Weekly* 34:34-35:2393-2399.

Notes and References

1. The World values Survey is a worldwide investigation of social, cultural and political change. Representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of publics in more than 65 societies on all six inhabited continents, containing almost 80 per cent of the world's population. It builds on the European Values Surveys, first carried out in 1981. A second wave of surveys, designed for global use, was completed in 1990-1991, a third wave was carried out in 1995-1996 and a fourth wave is taking place in 1999-2002. This investigation has produced evidence of gradual but pervasive changes in what people want out of life, and the basic direction of these changes is, to some extent, predictable. This study has given rise to more than 300 publications, in 16 languages. This project is being carried out by an international network of social scientists. For details see Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997.
2. 22 of these countries are advanced industrial democracies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America , 21 are developing nations (Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Uruguay, Zimbabwe) and 21 are post-Communist polities (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine).
3. This section is a revised version of a paper presented at Seminar (Shastri 2001c)
4. In the study, the caste group of the respondents were ascertained. For the purpose of the study, the social groups have been classified into Forward Castes (which includes the Upper Castes and other Dominant castes), Backward Castes (educationally and socially backward social groups), Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes , Muslims and others.